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MEDICAL RIGHTS FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES AND
RAINBOW FAMILIES
Anisa Mohanty *

I. INTRODUCTION
The present state of the law regarding medical rights for same-sex
couples and their families is highly inconsistent. A handful of states permit
same-sex marriage. 1 Another handful of states recognize same-sex
marriages from other states, allow civil unions with state-level spousal
rights for same-sex couples, or extend some or nearly all state-level spousal
rights to unmarried couples in domestic partnerships. 2 With these widely
disparate levels of recognition, it becomes difficult for same-sex couples to
navigate their options and rights when a loved one—a partner or child—has
a medical emergency or is in the hospital. In Part II, this Comment will
examine the present state of the law regarding hospital visitation and
medical decision-making for partners and non-biological parents in several
states, using North Carolina, which does not have a constitutional ban
against same-sex marriage, 3 and Florida, which has denied recognition of
same-sex marriage under all circumstances, 4 as examples. Part III will

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2007, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SAME SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS AND
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS (2009), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 (last visited Oct. 3,
2009) (As of this writing, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire
permit same-sex marriages. California recognizes same-sex marriages performed before November 4,
2008. Rhode Island, New York, and the District of Columbia recognize same-sex marriages from other
states. Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, and New Hampshire permit civil unions, providing statelevel spousal rights to same-sex couples. Four states—California, Oregon, Washington, and Nevada—
provide nearly all state-level spousal rights to unmarried couples through domestic partnerships.
Finally, Hawaii, Maine, the District of Columbia, and Wisconsin provide some state-level spousal rights
to unmarried couples in domestic partnerships.).
2. Id.
3. See Mike Baker, Poll: Half of N.C. adults oppose marriage amendment, WRAL.COM, Mar. 23, 2009,
http://www.wral.com/news/state/story/4794291/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
4. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 741.04, 741.212 (LexisNexis 2009).
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explore the justifications and criticisms of expanded rights for such
families. Part IV will examine the difficulties presented by the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in creating uniform law. Finally, Part
V will propose a Model Act that can ameliorate some of the uncertainty
surrounding the rights for same-sex couples.
II. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Medical Visitation
1. Partners
Legal scholarship regarding medical visitation policies is sparse.
Medical visitation policies are typically defined by individual hospitals. 5
Traditionally, visitation policies in cases of emergency permit only
“immediate family” members to visit patients. 6 While hospitals define
internally who may qualify as an “immediate family member,” and there
may be no inherent legal right of spousal visitation, protection for the
spousal relationship is implied within these policies. 7 It is unlikely that a
hospital would define “immediate family” in a way that excludes spouses,
and “[as] a practical matter, a spouse would only need a legal right to visit if
the hospital failed to admit spouses. In our current legal and cultural reality,
a spouse does not need a legal visitation right because a spouse is
automatically considered family.” 8 Even fiancé(e)s would almost certainly
be allowed to visit a loved one, though no legal relationship exists. 9
Except in the handful of states that afford full spousal legal rights and
privileges to same-sex couples, same-sex couples must create rights
affirmatively through legal documents, 10 and even then, they may not be
able to create equal rights to those afforded to heterosexual couples. A few
states have explicitly intervened to permit adults to receive visits from any

5. Nancy J. Knauer, Symposium, Abolishing Civil Marriage: A Marriage Skeptic Responds to the ProMarriage Proposals to Abolish Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1261, 1274 (2006).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Telephone Interview with Laura M. Willing, Medical Student, University of Virginia School of
Medicine (Oct. 4, 2009).
10. See generally KAREN MOULDING, NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAW 4-75 to 4-91 (National Lawyers Guild Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Rights Committee et al., 2009)
(1985) (providing forms lawyers may use in drafting powers of attorney and hospital visitation
authorizations for same-sex couples).
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individuals he or she desires. 11 A provision was added to North Carolina’s
Patient Bill of Rights in 2008 to allow a patient to designate visitors who
shall receive the same visitation privileges as the patient’s immediate
family members, regardless of whether the visitors are legally related to the
patient. 12 Similarly, Virginia has a provision that allows individuals to
designate whomever they wish to visit them in the hospital, subject to other
restrictions contained in the visitation policy, such as the number of visitors
permitted in the patient’s room simultaneously. 13 Maine permits adult
patients in a critical care unit to designate individuals to be considered as
immediate family members for the purpose of granting visitation rights,
either orally or in writing; but it is not clear whether a patient would be able
to pre-designate such individuals, and if so, whether such designations
would apply to a patient in emergent care situations. 14 In these instances,
however, the rights of a same-sex partner are not automatic, and such
statutes are sparse. At this time, there appears to have been no cases in
which an individual or patient has claimed a right of visitation that was
denied in states that allow patients to designate visitors.
Other states flatly prohibit or refuse to recognize visitation rights for
same-sex partners. In Florida, the federal district court in Miami ruled that
there is no legal obligation to allow visitors, including same-sex partners, in
an emergency situation. 15
2. Non-Biological Children
The issue of medical visitation becomes more complicated for a partner
who is not the biological parent of a child in a same-sex relationship. In
one case, a California hospital would not permit both mothers to stay with
their child, allowing only the biological mother to stay, even though the
women were registered domestic partners. 16

11. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-75; 131E-79; 131E-117; 143B-165 (2009).
12. Id.; see also Q-NOTES, STATE ENSURES GAY HOSPITAL VISITATION RIGHTS, Apr. 22, 2008,
http://www.q-notes.com/89/state-ensures-gay-hospital-visitation-rights/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2009)
[hereinafter Q-NOTES].
13. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-12, 32.1-127(15) (West 2009); see also EQUALITY VIRGINIA, HOSPITAL
VISITATION AND ADVANCE MEDICAL DIRECTIVES (2009), http://equalityvirginia.org/site/protecting-ourfamilies/hospital-visitation-and-advanced-medical-directives.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter
EQUALITY VIRGINIA].
14. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. XXII, § 1711(D)(1) (2009).
15. Tara Parker-Pope, No Visiting Rights for Hospital Trauma Patients, Sept. 30, 2009, N.Y. TIMES,
available at http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/no-visiting-rights-for-hospital-patients/; LAMBDA
LEGAL, LANGBEHN V. JACKSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL (2009), http://www.lambdalegal.org/incourt/cases/langbehn-v-jackson-memorial.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
16. Tara Parker-Pope, How Hospitals Treat Same-Sex Couples, May 12, 2009, N.Y. TIMES, available at
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Whereas the law often affords heterosexual stepparents an easy path to
adoption or another formal legal or quasi-legal relationship to stepchildren,
same-sex parents are not afforded the same presumptions. 17 Adoption
rights for same-sex couples are severely limited in many states, and such
rights are prohibited outright in a few, including Florida. 18 Even where
permitted, it is a complicated process that involves more than signing a few
forms. 19 Adoption by a same-sex parent traditionally terminates the
parental rights of the biological parent, i.e., when a same-sex mother adopts
a child, the biological mother’s rights are terminated. 20 In 2005, the
Durham County District Court in North Carolina waived the statutory
provisions that terminate the biological parent’s parental rights in the case
of second parent adoptions. 21 While the permissibility of the original
waiver is still in question, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held the
second parent adoption to be a valid order even after the couple separated. 22
Traditionally, heterosexual stepparents have been given limited authority
over stepchildren when they are in direct control or acting in loco parentis,
even in the absence of adoption, 23 which would conceivably give them
authority to remain with a child in the case of an emergency in the absence
of the biological parent. Except in states that validate same-sex marriages,
unions, or domestic partnerships and include in loco parentis provisions for
stepparents, 24 there are no such protections for same-sex parents. Finally,
children, unlike adults, are typically not extended the right to give
whomever they wish the permission to visit them in the hospital, 25 and
realistically, it would be extraordinarily rare that a child would have the
requisite medical directives in place.

http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/how-hospitals-treat-same-sex-couples/?hp.
17. See generally Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values
by a “Simulacrum of Marriage,” 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1756–84 (1998).
18. Id. at 1763-65 (discussing the barriers to same-sex adoption, including the heightened scrutiny of
state social services agencies and judges in determining the “best interests of the child.” In one case, an
original adoption order was revoked after a gay couple split up.); LAMBDA LEGAL, IN YOUR STATE
(2009), http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
19. See Christensen, supra note 17, at 1763–66.
20. See Boseman v. Jarrell, 681 S.E.2d 374, 376 (N.C. App. 2009).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 381–82.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-1-106(c), 43-3-606(9) (2008).
24. See IOWA CODE ANN. 252A.2(2) (Supp. 1996) (establishing a duty of a stepparent to a stepchild and
distinguishing between a stepchild and a legally adopted child); see also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
25. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127(B)(15) (2009) (allowing for permission to be extended by adults
only); see also EQUALITY VIRGINIA, supra note 13.
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B. Medical Decision-making
1. Partners
Medical decision-making in all fifty states can be carried out by anyone
who has been assigned “power of attorney,” or is the “attorney-in-fact.” 26
In North Carolina, for power of attorney to be “durable,” or to remain in
effect when a person is incapacitated, it must be recorded. 27 A physician
must typically sign a written statement of a person’s incapacity before
power of attorney takes effect. 28 Assigning power of attorney is critical for
same-sex couples (and unmarried heterosexual couples) in states where they
are not afforded the same rights as heterosexual married couples. Without
power of attorney, medical decision-making typically goes to the nearest
legal relative. 29
Same-sex couples with valid durable powers of attorney have still faced
severe discrimination. Washington State citizens Janice Langbehn, Lisa
Pond, and their children went on vacation in Florida, where Pond collapsed
from an aneurysm shortly before boarding a cruise ship. 30 Pond had taken
appropriate legal precautions by designating Langbehn as her legal guardian
and giving her medical power of attorney. 31 Hospital officials refused to
recognize Langbehn or their children as family, because same-sex
marriages and partnerships are not recognized in Florida, and the federal
court in Miami held that there was no duty or legal obligation to allow
visitors in the hospital. 32 Most troubling is that the hospital failed to
recognize Langbehn’s power of attorney, which may be assigned to any
competent individual regardless of familial relationship, both under
Washington and Florida law. 33 Similarly, Bill Flanigan was not permitted

26. DENIS CLIFFORD ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 131 (14th ed. 2007),
available
at
http://books.google.com/books?id=eiSFx_Fm-FcC&dq=Hayden+Curry+%26+Denis
+Clifford,+A+legal+Guide+For+Lesbian+and+Gay+Couples&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=MJ
F341Wipf&sig=9UAn02v9dU65dCP2zmCm9bjMoQ&hl=en&ei=2cTHSpu5D4qW8Aa858XhCA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#v=
onepage&q=power%20of%20attorney&f=false.
27. Id. at 138.
28. Id. at 125.
29. Q-NOTES, supra note 12.
30. Steve Rothaus, Lesbian’s case against Jackson Memorial Hospital tossed, MIAMI HERALD (Fla.),
Sept. 30, 2009, at B3, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/story/
1258772.html?storylink=mirelated.
31. Luara Figueroa, Gay Woman Fights over Hospital Visitation Rights in Miami court, MIAMI HERALD
(Fla.), Feb. 8, 2009, at B5, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/02/08-4.
32. Rothaus, supra note 30.
33. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.94.010 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08(2) (LexisNexis 2009).
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to see his dying partner, Robert Daniel, at the University of Maryland
Health Care System, even though he was assigned as Daniel’s attorney-infact. 34 The hospital knowingly violated the durable power of attorney
Flanigan had on behalf of Daniel, and it violated national accreditation
standards for hospitals, which define “family” as individuals who play “a
significant role in the individual’s life,” including persons “not legally
related to the individual.” 35
Despite the fact that valid durable power of attorney can address samesex partner rights for prepared couples, people rarely plan for the worst.
The presumption that persons close to patients should have access to
information about the patient without explicit authorization is expressed by
federal law. 36 Under federal health information privacy regulations
promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), health care providers are permitted, but are not required, to
disclose certain health information to individuals close to the patient. 37
Providers “may... disclose to a family member, other relative, or close
personal friend of the individual, the protected health information directly
relevant to such person’s involvement with the individual’s care or payment
related to the individual’s health care.” 38 Providers may also “use or
disclose protected health information to notify... a family member, a
personal representative of the individual, or another person responsible for
the care of the individual of the individual’s location, general condition, or
death.” 39 When an individual is not present or otherwise incapacitated, a
provider “may use professional judgment and its experience with common
practice to make reasonable inferences of the individual’s best interest in
allowing a person to act on behalf of the individual to pick up filled
prescriptions, medical supplies, X-rays, or other similar forms of protected
health information.” 40 While the regulations allow providers the discretion
to keep same-sex partners apprised of an individual’s medical condition and
involved in some decisions regarding treatment of that individual, it does
not appear to be the practice. 41

34. Knauer, supra note 5, at 1274–75.
35. LAMBDA LEGAL, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM TO BE SUED WEDNESDAY BY GAY
MAN PREVENTED FROM VISITING HIS DYING PARTNER AT SHOCK TRAUMA CENTER IN BALTIMORE
(2002), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/university-of-maryland.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
36. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(1)(i) (2009).
37. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 164 (2009).
38. 45 C.F.R § 164.510(b)(1)(i) (2009).
39. Id. § 164.510(b)(1)(ii).
40. Id. § 164.510(b)(3).
41. See generally LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 35.
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2. Non-Biological Children
For same-sex parents of non-biological children, complications in
medical decision-making rights are similar to those in medical visitation for
non-biological same-sex parents. Some states, or jurisdictions within those
states, permit joint and second parent adoptions, and these adoptions must
be recognized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 42 When joint or second parent adoptions are not available,
there may be options such as an “authorization for consent to medical
treatment of a minor” 43 or other legal guardianship arrangements. In the
absence of the establishment of formal legal relationships, stepparents and
same-sex non-biological parents alike have virtually no rights to make
medical decisions on behalf of their children, even in case of emergencies
where the biological parent may be absent. 44 This presents a difficult
situation, because same-sex parent-child relationships may drastically vary
in character from the typical stepparent-stepchild relationship. Parenting
authority is more likely to mirror that of heterosexual parents, who are both
equally qualified to speak for the child. Thus, it is possible that in the
same-sex context, emergency medical decisions could ultimately be made
by individuals who are less qualified to speak for the child’s best interests.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS AND CRITICISMS
A. ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR CHANGING EXISTING LAW
Same-sex couples face discrimination that cannot be justified when
compared to their heterosexual counterparts. Take, for instance, a child
conceived through in vitro fertilization or through other forms of assisted
reproductive technology by a heterosexual married couple. The law makes
no distinction in parental rights when a child results from artificial
insemination or from natural conception of heterosexual married couples,
even though circumstances are “functionally equivalent” to similarlysituated same-sex couples. 45 Gay couples must turn to second parent
adoption, while the law does not penalize the heterosexual marital

42. 365GAY.COM, COURT RULES FLA. MUST HONOR GAY SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS, May 13, 2009,
available at http://www.365gay.com/news/court-rules-fla-must-honor-gay-second-parent-adoptions/
(last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
43. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, HEALTHCARE EQUALITY INDEX: WHAT IS MEANT BY SAME-SEX
PARENTS? (2009), http://www.hrc.org/issues/11348.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
44. Id.
45. See generally Christensen, supra note 17, at 1699, 1763.
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relationship; rather, it glosses over the fact that one parent is necessarily not
the biological parent.
The need for uniformity in medical visitation and decision-making laws
is illustrated by the Langbehn case. 46 Would Langbehn have been
prohibited from visiting Pond in the Florida hospital if she had been just a
friend or a distant relative with legal guardianship and medical power of
attorney?
Another similarly situated story is about David Wilson and Rob
Compton, same-sex partners from Massachusetts. Compton needed
emergency surgery for a kidney stone while he was in Rhode Island and
remarked that the Rhode Island hospital allowed Wilson to visit him:
“[t]hey just smiled and they knew I was from Massachusetts and didn’t say
anything.” 47 What Compton may not have realized was that Rhode Island
is one of three U.S. jurisdictions that recognize same-sex marriages from
other states. 48 If his emergency had occurred in a state such as Florida, or
even in North Carolina where documentation of Compton’s wishes would
have been required, his marital status may not have enabled Wilson to
visit. 49 Compton’s implied right to visit grew out of his recognized
marriage, an implied right that is largely denied by states that do not
recognize same-sex marriage. 50
Both of these cases illustrate the need for uniform laws regarding
medical rights. Even if a same-sex couple has taken all necessary legal
precautions in the state that they reside, medical emergencies can occur in
unexpected places, including across state lines. Same-sex couples may
find, as Langbehn and Pond did, that even the rights of married same-sex
partners may not be as clear-cut or simple as they assume. 51 A Model Act
would provide uniformity and ensure that individuals are adequately
prepared by lending some predictability to these situations, and more
importantly, it would ensure that visitation and treatment are carried out in
accordance with the patient’s wishes.

46. Langbehn v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County., 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
47. Deborah Feyerick & Sheila Steffen, Same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, 4 years later, CNN.COM,
June 16, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/06/16/feyerick.samesex.marriage/index.html (last visited
Oct. 3, 2009).
48. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 1.
49. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (LexisNexis 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-75; 131E-79; 131E117; 143B-165 (2009).
50. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 1.
51. MOULDING, supra note 10, at 2–7.
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B. Responding to Criticisms Against Expanding the Law
1. Establishing the validity of the relationship
a. Partners
There are several criticisms to expanding medical visitation and medical
decision-making rights to same-sex partners. With respect to expanding
decision-making rights, perhaps the most convincing criticism is the
difficulty in confirming the actual existence of a partner relationship in the
absence of any legal status such as a marriage, civil union, or domestic
partnership. 52 Some states have offered a unique solution by expanding
rights for unmarried couples—whether heterosexual or homosexual—if
they can show “mutual interdependence” through indicia such as joint
checking accounts or common property ownership. 53 This may ameliorate
the situation, but while heterosexual couples typically do not have to offer
proof of marriage by showing a marriage license, homosexual couples are
required to show documentation that may not be available in an
emergency, 54 and thus doing so would waste precious time even when a
partner is able to successfully negotiate to stay with a hospitalized partner.
An Oregon man was forced to make a case to hospital administrators before
being able to stay with his dying partner, even though he was his registered
domestic partner. 55
Other states, such as New York, have included “close friends” in the
decision-making hierarchy, which permits same-sex partners to be
recognized as legal surrogates. 56 However, such a designation comes after
siblings, parents, and other adult relatives of a patient, effectively meaning a
partner may not be able to exercise the right. 57
With even fiancé(e)s barred from making medical decisions without
formal power of attorney, 58 it appears difficult to justify allowing same-sex

52. See Parker-Pope, supra note 15.
53. Associated Press, Maryland OKs rights for gay couples, CHICAGOFREEPRESS.COM, Mar. 18, 2008,
available at http://www.chicagofreepress.com/node/1521.
54. See Parker-Pope, supra note 15.
55. Id.
56. Duncan Joseph Moore, Medical Surrogacy Mediation: Expanding Patient, Family, and Physician
Rights and Reformulating the Virginia Health Care Decisions Act, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 410, 426
(2001).
57. Id.
58. Telephone Interview with Laura M. Willing, Medical Student, University of Virginia School of
Medicine (Oct. 4, 2009).

376

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIII:xxv

partners to make decisions. Nevertheless, with same-sex couples unable to
establish a formal legal relationship, it offends the notions of justice and
equality to make this the prerequisite for the right to make decisions.
b. Non-Biological Children
Stepparents and same-sex parents alike have no inherent legal
protections or rights to speak for their non-biological children. It can be
argued that both classes of non-biological parents must go through the same
process of adopting the child of their partners in order to create affirmative
rights, and thus no disparity exists in the treatment of same-sex and
However, this argument fails to take into
heterosexual couples. 59
consideration that the law has created exceptions to allow stepparents to
adopt without altering the biological parent’s parental rights. 60 Even
surrogacy laws offer more protection for the “intended [heterosexual]
parents” than for similarly situated homosexual couples. 61
2. Medical Malpractice
Perhaps the most convincing argument against expanding the right of
same-sex partners to make medical decisions is the threat of medical
malpractice suits by blood relatives. 62 Health care providers can ill afford
to disclose health information to, or allow, the “wrong” individual to make
decisions on behalf of a patient. 63 Providers may be subject to great
financial liability and medical ethics violations for refusing a blood relative
to make decisions regarding an incapacitated patient. 64 While it is tenuous
whether a cause of action, upon which to sue, exists for same-sex partners
who are not in a legally cognizable relationship with the patient, 65 failing to

59. Christensen, supra note 17, at 1763.
60. Id. at 1766.
61. Id. at 1762.
62. Telephone Interview with Laura M. Willing, Medical Student, University of Virginia School of
Medicine (Oct. 4, 2009).
63. Id.
64. See JOHN E. SNYDER ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICAL ETHICS: CASES FOR PRACTICE-BASED
LEARNING 19 (Humana Press) (2008), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=93y_6FFm8ikC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_navlinks_s#v=on
epage&q=&f=false (in the absence of medical power of attorney, common law and state statutes permit
these decisions to be made by family members: legal guardian, spouse, and a majority of first degree
relatives (parents and children); these individuals would presumably have a cause of action if their
decision-making rights are breached); see 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.104 et seq. (2009).
65. See Langbehn v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1336–37 (S.D.
Fla. 2009); Complaint, Flanigan v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. (Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 27, 2002), available
at http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/118.pdf.

2010]

MEDICAL RIGHTS

377

provide access and rights to same-sex partners is likely to result in
continued litigation.
3. Federal Regulations
When 45 C.F.R. Part 164 was promulgated, the Department of Health
and Human Services (“Department”) clarified:
We continue to allow covered entities to use their
discretion to disclose certain protected health information
to family members, relatives, close friends, and other
persons assisting in the care of an individual, in accordance
with [45 C.F.R.] § 164.510(b). We recognize that many
health care decisions take place on an informal basis, and
we permit disclosures in certain circumstance to permit this
practice to continue. Health care providers may continue to
use their discretion to address these informal situations. 66
The Department intended to and did leave substantial discretion to
practitioners to determine who may or may not be appropriate parties to
receive confidential health information. 67
However, one commenter “sought clarification that ‘close personal
friend’ was intended to include domestic partners and same-sex couples in
committed relationships.” 68 The Department responded:
As discussed in the preamble of the final rule, this
provision allows disclosures to domestic partners and
others in same-sex relationships when such individuals are
involved in an individual’s care or are the point of contact
for notification in a disaster. We do not intend to change
current practices with respect to involvement of others in
an individual’s treatment decisions; informal informationsharing among persons involved; or the sharing of
protected health information during a disaster. As noted
above, a power of attorney or other legal relationship to an
individual is not necessary for these informal discussions

66. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,501 (Dec. 28, 2000).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 82,665.
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about the individual for the purpose of assisting in or
providing a service related to the individual’s care. 69
While the Department left substantial discretion to practitioners, it
clearly did not intend to actively exclude same-sex partners from medical
decision-making. 70
Similarly, a “personal representative” for an
unempancipated minor child “may include a parent, guardian, or person
acting in loco parentis,” 71 which allows non-biological same-sex parents
(and stepparents) to speak for the child, particularly in cases of emergency
where the biological parent may not be available.
4. Opening the Door to Gay Marriage
Opponents of gay marriage posit that the present law affords enough
protections for same-sex couples with respect to medical visitation and
medical decision-making. They suggest the idea that denying a same-sex
partner the right to visit their loved ones in hospitals is “incredulous,” and
that granting a health care proxy to a partner can preclude the exclusion of a
partner in making health care decisions for an unconscious or mentally
incapacitated patient. 72 However, a number of cases have demonstrated
that same-sex partners are routinely denied visitation rights, and even with
the requisite legal documentation, are denied the right to have whom they
choose to make decisions for them. 73 Greater burdens must be placed on
physicians to honor patients’ wishes.
All of these “snowball effect” arguments also overlook several key
points. The first is the right of patient dignity. In the case of Robert Daniel,
Bill Flanigan was not able to consult with doctors or tell surgeons about
Daniel’s wish to forgo life-prolonging measures, and by the time Flanigan
was able to see Daniel, he was no longer conscious and had been intubated
against his wishes. 74 Additionally, expanded protections would provide
rights to a range of nontraditional families—same-sex couples, stepparents,
long-term heterosexual partners, and fiancé(e)s—in which the traditional
decision-making hierarchy is not best suited to intervene. Physicians would

69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 82,500.
72. PETER SPRIG, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: WHAT’S WRONG WITH
LETTING
SAME-SEX
COUPLES
“MARRY?,”
FAMILY
RESEARCH
COUNCIL,
http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=if03h01 (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
73. See e.g., Langbehn v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1331–33
(S.D. Fla. 2009); Complaint at 4–9, Flanigan v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. (Md. Cir. Ct. Feb, 27,
2002).
74. Complaint at 8–11, Flanigan.
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be able to apply their best judgment for the patient’s interest without fear of
malpractice judgments.
IV. DIFFICULTIES UNDER DOMA
Perhaps the greatest barrier to respecting same-sex relationships and
patient’s wishes is the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”). 75
DOMA states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State,
territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship. 76
In short, no state is obligated to recognize the legal relationship—
marriage, civil union, or registered domestic partnership—granted by
another state to a same-sex couple. 77 Therefore, the absence of legal
documentation such as power of attorney, a same-sex couple legally
married in Massachusetts and afforded full and equal protections to
heterosexual married couples could still face the same problems in a state
that affords lesser protections. 78 A Model Act would have no effect unless
it was adopted by all 50 states, because DOMA overrides the effect of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause 79 as applied to marriage. DOMA allows
“states not only to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages, but also any
rights arising out of such marriages.” 80 Nevertheless, allowing same-sex
couples the full right to medical visitation, and even medical decisionmaking, would not threaten the underlying justifications for DOMA in
allowing states to defend the institution of marriage, 81 and determine the
marital status of its domiciles. 82 Additionally, DOMA has been misapplied

75. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
76. Defense of Marriage Act, § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Defense of Marriage Act § 2.
80. Roderick T. Chen & Alexandra K. Glazier, Can Same-Sex Partners Consent to Organ Donation?,
29 AM. J. L. & MED. 31, 38 (2003).
81. Id. at 39–40.
82. Id at 37.
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to justify denial of full faith and credit in circumstances not intended by the
Act. In Langbehn, the federal district court in Miami appears to have
confused typical, full faith and credit provided by power of attorney, with
other rights that the state is not federally obligated to recognize because
they are intertwined with same-sex partner status. 83
VI. MODEL ACT
With the recognition that true parity cannot exist for same-sex couples
where same-sex marriages or same-sex unions are not recognized or
afforded equal rights to that of heterosexual marriages, a Model Act would
address many of the challenges faced by same-sex couples when a loved
one is unexpectedly in the hospital. It would also address situations in
which state legislatures have not clearly addressed whether full rights and
privileges are afforded to same-sex couple. However, same-sex couples
would still carry the burden of affirmatively creating rights, as the onus
remains on the couple to complete the necessary paperwork to ensure their
access to partners and children. Couples living near another jurisdiction in
which they are not domiciled should check the laws of that state to
determine if they need to take additional legal precautions. Same-sex
couples who have created certain affirmative rights in their own state
should take similar precautions when traveling to another state, in addition
to traveling with appropriate documentation.
Adoption of a Model Act would also reinforce that, while DOMA
controls a state’s choice to recognize same-sex marriage and rights created
out of that marriage, 84 DOMA does not control where another primary
source of authority governs and dictates whether states should honor valid
contractual agreements and provisions made by same-sex couples.
Outlined below are key provisions that should be included in such an
Act:

83. See Langbehn v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1336–37 (S.D.
Fla. 2009).
84. See supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text.
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MODEL MEDICAL VISITATION AND DECISION-MAKING ACT
(“MMVDMA”)
Section 1. Definitions
A. Eligible same-sex couple. “Eligible same-sex couple” shall be defined
as a same-sex couple who can demonstrate that they are committed.
Accepted documentation to prove eligibility includes: joint checking
accounts, shared credit cards, joint homeownership, joint leaseholders,
children conceived or adopted through mutual decision, guardianship
authorizations for the couple’s children, engagement to be married,
designation as insurance beneficiary, and exchanging of rings. This list is
not intended to be exhaustive, and determination of whether a couple is
committed is based on the totality of the circumstances. 85
B. Eligible same-sex partner. “Eligible same-sex partner” shall be defined
as a same-sex partner who can demonstrate that he or she is committed
under subsection A of this section. 86
C. Eligible heterosexual couple. “Eligible heterosexual couple” shall be
defined as a couple who can demonstrate they are committed. Accepted
documentation to prove eligibility includes: joint checking accounts, shared
credit cards, joint homeownership, joint leaseholders, children conceived or
adopted through mutual decision, guardianship authorizations for the
couple’s children, engagement to be married, designation as insurance
beneficiary, and exchanging of rings. This list is not intended to be
exhaustive, and determination of whether a couple is committed is based on
the totality of the circumstances.

85. Cf. In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 792–93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (requiring that the appointment
of a guardian be someone who would operate in “the best interests of the ward,” and considering factors
such as the reasonable preference of the ward, if able to form a preference; the interaction between the
proposed guardian in promoting the welfare of the ward; and kinship, although not as conclusive (citing
MINN. STAT. §§ 525.539(7), 525.551(5) (1990)); Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 251 F.3d 604, 606
(7th Cir. 2001) (stating conditions a partner must satisfy to qualify for partner benefits, including being
the sole domestic partner; living together for at least one year; jointly owning their home; jointly owning
other property of specified kinds; or being the primary beneficiary of the partner’s will); HUMAN RES.
SERVS. UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND, SAME-SEX DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS POLICY (2008),
http://hr.richmond.edu/guidelines/samesex.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (requiring an employee who
seeks same-sex benefits for a domestic partner to complete an affidavit attesting, among other things,
that the partners consider each other to be life partners; that neither is married to another individual; that
the partners are each other’s sole domestic partners and intend to continue as such indefinitely; that the
partners have shared a common household for at least six months immediately prior to the date of the
affidavit and intend to do so indefinitely; and that the partners are “financially interdependent, share
common necessities of life and are jointly responsible for the common welfare and shared financial
obligations of each other”).
86. Substantially similar factors can be used to determine eligibility of heterosexual partners. See supra
note 87 and accompanying text.
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D. Eligible heterosexual partner. “Eligible heterosexual partner” shall be
defined as a heterosexual partner who can demonstrate that he or she is
committed under subsection C of this section.
E. Unmarried couple. “Unmarried couple” includes eligible same-sex and
eligible heterosexual couples who can demonstrate they are committed
under subsections A or B of this section. It shall also include couples who
are legally married, in a common law marriage, civil union, or domestic
partnership in their state of origin.
Section 2. Forms
State should provide forms or forms substantially similar to those found in
Appendix A for the creation of
(A) Durable (medical) power of attorney;
(B) Medical visitation rights; and
(C) Guardianship arrangements for children
made available on the Internet and in print through the State’s department
of health or social services. If duly authorized, witnessed, and notarized,
these forms shall be honored by the State, regardless of the state of origin.
Section 3. Unmarried Couples
A. Medical Visitation. State shall permit eligible same-sex partners and
eligible heterosexual partners, as defined by subsections B and D of section
1, to qualify as immediate family members for the purposes of hospital
visitation. At minimum, State must recognize valid medical visitation
authorizations prepared by the eligible couple.
B. Medical Decisions. State shall permit eligible same-sex partners and
eligible heterosexual partners, as defined by subsections B and D of section
1, to make both minor and major medical decisions for their partners. At
minimum, State must recognize valid durable power of attorney prepared
by the eligible couple.
Section 4. Non-Biological Children
A. Medical Visitation. Where joint or second parent adoption has not
occurred or is not available, State recognizes stepparents and same-sex nonbiological parents as standing in loco parentis for the purposes of
accompanying a child to the hospital or for the purposes of hospital
visitation in case of medical emergency. At minimum, State must
recognize a valid guardianship arrangement prepared by the biological and
non-biological parent of the child.
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B. Minor Medical Decisions. Where joint or second parent adoption has
not occurred or is not available, State recognizes stepparents and same-sex
non-biological parents are authorized to make minor medical decisions in
the absence of the biological parent. Biological parents must be consulted
with before making major medical decisions such as the authorization of
non-life saving medical procedures or discontinuing life support.
APPENDIX A – Forms
VI. CONCLUSION
As long as same-sex partnerships are not given the same level of
protection in all fifty states, or until DOMA is repealed, there may be no
perfect solution to ensuring that same-sex partners will be able to choose
who visits or speaks for them in cases of medical emergencies. Further,
until DOMA is repealed, partners will face difficulties in being recognized
as individuals with full legal standing to bring suit on behalf of breach of
their rights and on behalf of their partners’ rights. 87
Congress and the courts should make it clear, however, that DOMA’s
application is limited to the recognition of marital status and rights
thereunder, and that it cannot be used as a justification to deny other
established legal rights. It must ensure that assigned medical rights are
fully recognized as designations unaffiliated with marital status.
Meanwhile, same-sex couples must ensure they have created all the
affirmative rights they are able to under existing law by properly
designating durable powers of attorney, granting medical visitation, and
establishing legal guardianships with non-biological children, including
seeking second parent or joint parent adoptions where feasible. 88 They
must prepare for the worst, and sadly, should consider the extent to which
their rights will be recognized or compromised if they cross state lines.

87. See supra Part II.A.1.
88. See supra Part II.B.

